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Pension Politics in Three Small States: 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands 
Karen M. Anderson 
Abstract: This article emphasizes class politics and path dependence in accounting for the 
development of pension regimes in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. The political strength 
of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in alliance with the trade unions resulted in the emergence 
of a statist pension system. In the Netherlands and Denmark, a politically weak and divided left 
settled for collectively regulated but privately organized supplementary pensions. However, the 
Dutch and Danish cases suggest that several types of pension regime structure are capable of 
producing "social democratic" outcomes such as poverty alleviation, reducing income inequality, 
and covering various risk profiles. In both countries, private occupational pensions thus produced 
outcomes similar to those of Sweden. These historical choices decisively shaped the subsequent 
development of pensions. 
Resume: Cet article met l'accent sur la politique de classes et la continuite institutionnelle (path 
dependence) pour expliquer le d6veloppement des regimes de pension en Suede, au Danemark et 
aux Pays-Bas. La puissance politique du Parti Social D6mocrate suedois dans le cadre de son 
alliance avec les syndicats a provoqu6 l'emergence d'un systeme de pension 6tatiste. Aux Pays-Bas 
et au Danemark, une gauche divis6e et politiquement faible s'est content6e d'un systeme de pensions 
complementaires r6gule collectivement mais organis6 de maniere priv6e. Cependant, les cas 
neerlandais et danois suggerent que diff6rents types de structures institutionnelles peuvent produire 
des r6sultats "sociaux d6mocrates" tels que la reduction de la pauvret6, la r6duction des in6galit6s, 
et la couverture de diff6rents profils de risque. Dans ces deux pays, des pensions priv6es ont donc 
produit des r6sultats semblables a ceux du systeme su6dois. Ces choix historiques ont profond6ment 
influenc6 les d6veloppements ult6rieurs de ces systemes de pension. 
Implicit in much of the welfare state development literature is the assumption 
that only the public sector can deliver outcomes commonly associated with the 
"social democratic regime" (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This is especially true 
for pensions, where publicly organized retirement provision was frequently 
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considered the best vehicle for alleviating poverty in old age, reducing income 
inequality among pensioners, and promoting income equality between pen- 
sioners and wage earners. Comparative analysis of pension regimes in 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands suggests that the public sector is not 
necessarily the only path leading to equality and solidarity. All three countries 
provide universal basic pensions, but the three systems diverge in terms of 
supplementary coverage. The Swedish system includes public, earnings-related 
benefits for all wage earners, whereas Danish and Dutch occupational pensions 
are organized in the private sector. Although occupational pensions are 
privately organized, the Danish and Dutch pension regimes deliver outcomes 
similar to Sweden's. Old age poverty levels are similar in all three countries, 
as is income inequality among pensioners. 
Comparison of the Swedish, Dutch and Danish pension systems suggests 
that there are multiple institutional pathways toward similar outcomes (Huber, 
Ragin, and Stephens, 1993; Van Kersbergen, 1995), and this article draws on 
this tradition by emphasizing the role of party politics and path dependence. 
The article emphasizes the political mobilization of the left and its coalitions 
with other societal groups to explain different paths toward similar outcomes. 
In Sweden, Social Democratic hegemony and union strength resulted in the 
emergence of a statist pension system. In the Netherlands and Denmark, the 
weakness of the political left necessitated cooperation with confessional and 
liberal groups respectively, and these left their mark primarily in the organiza- 
tion of occupational pensions. In both countries, a politically weak left settled 
for collectively regulated but privately organized occupational pensions that, 
despite their location within the market rather than the state sphere, produce 
outcomes similar to Sweden's. These historical choices decisively shaped the 
subsequent development of pensions. 
The Three Pension Systems 
Until recently, Sweden was usually seen as the prototype of the social demo- 
cratic pension regime because the public sector dominated pension provision 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). The Swedish system also generated large publicly 
controlled pension funds (AP Funds); in 1992, the AP Funds equalled 35 % of 
GDP (Proposition 1993/94: 250, 16). Collectively bargained occupational 
pensions covering 90% of the labour force topped up public benefits. Denmark 
and the Netherlands are typically considered weak cases of social democratic 
pension policy, because Danish and Dutch social democrats failed to introduce 
generous public supplementary pensions. The Danish pension system is marked 
by universal basic provision, topped up by modest public supplementary pen- 
sions and increasingly important (private) labour market pensions. The Dutch 
system combines a public flat rate pension with mandated private occupational 
pensions based on the principle of solidarity. 
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Despite these institutional differences, the three pension regimes deliver 
broadly similar social outcomes. Poverty rates among the retired in all three 
countries are among the lowest in the world, as are levels of income equality 
among pensioners and between pensioners and wage earners. Table 1 shows 
poverty rates among older persons in 11 rich countries according to the two 
most common methods of determining poverty rates. Sweden shows the lowest 
poverty rate, closely followed by Denmark and the Netherlands. In Disney and 
Whitehouse's (2002: 20) study of the economic well-being of older people in 
16 rich countries, Denmark had the lowest level of income inequality among 
pensioners, followed closely by Sweden, Australia, Finland, and the Nether- 
lands.1 
The three pension regimes also deliver similar results in other ways. All 
three pension systems have a relatively high degree of funding (see table 2). 
All three pension systems also cover a variety of risk profiles because all 
citizens receive basic coverage via the basic pension. Finally, recent changes 
in all three pension systems significantly strengthen work incentives. The latest 
round of reforms in all three countries tightened the link between contributions 
and benefits and reduced incentives for early retirement. The Netherlands in 
particular has taken significant steps toward reducing early exit (Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997). In the 1970s and 1980s, the supplementary pension system 
(along with disability and unemployment insurance) provided an attractive 
early exit route for redundant wage earners (Trommel, 1995). Dutch early exit 
rates remain stubbornly high despite this progress. The OECD (2003) reports 
that the effective retirement age for men in Sweden was 63.8 in the period 
1995-2000, 64.3 for Denmark and 60.7 in the Netherlands. The effective 
female retirement age in the same period shows a similar pattern: in Sweden 
it is 62.5, 60.6 in Denmark and 59 in the Netherlands (OECD, 2003: 54). 
In short, these three pension systems are relatively resistant to both endo- 
genous and exogenous pressures. Endogenous pressures, including changing 
family patterns, the growth of non-standard work, etc., do not lead to increased 
poverty among retirees because the basic pension provides a minimum level 
of coverage, despite career interruptions. Exogenous pressures such as the 
financial market integration and EMU are less likely to lead to pressure on 
public budgets because pensions are partially or fully funded. Thus although 
the Netherlands and Denmark rely mainly on the private sector for income- 
related benefits, outcomes (as defined above) are broadly similar to Sweden's. 
The Dutch and the Danes have followed a pension path that is less statist than 
the Swedish, but only in terms in supplementary pension provision. All OECD 
countries regulate private pensions in some way; the question is whether and 
1. For similar results, see Hauser (1998). 
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Table 1. Poverty Rates for the Elderly in the 1990s 
Country Year 40% Poverty rate 50% Poverty rate 
Sweden 1995 0.8 2.7 
Norway 1995 0.9 14.0 
Luxembourg 1994 0.9 6.7 
Finland 1995 1.2 5.4 
Canada 1997 1.4 5.3 
Netherlands 1994 3.3 6.4 
France 1994 3.4 9.8 
Denmark 1992 3.7 11.1 
Spain 1990 3.9 11.3 
Germany 1994 4.0 7.0 
United Kingdom 1995 4.0 13.7 
Source: Smeeding and Williamson, 2001. 
Table 2. Pension Assets as Percent of GDP 
1987 1996 
Sweden 33.4 32.6 
Denmark 10.9 23.9 
Netherlands 45.5 87.3 
Germany 3.4 5.8 
France - 5.6 
Switzerland 74.7 117.1 
United States 35.7 58.2 
United Kingdom 62.3 74.7 
Source: OECD (1998). 
Note: The number for Sweden includes the assets in the publicly managed AP Funds. Bonoli (2003) 
reports a lower level of assets for Sweden, probably because the AP Funds are not included. 
how public regulation affects the outcomes described above. The Danish and 
Dutch modes of public regulation of private supplementary pensions have 
resulted in near-universal coverage for wage earners. 
How did our three pensions reach these destinations? The next section 
traces the historical development of pension arrangements, both public and 
private, in Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Sweden 
The public pension system currently consists of three parts: the "guarantee pen- 
sion," the "income pension," and the "premium pension." The guarantee 
pension, introduced as part of the 1994/98 reform, replaced the old basic pen- 
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sion, and it is a "pension-tested" benefit that provides a basic benefit roughly 
equal to the combined value of the old basic pension and pension supplement. 
The "income pension" replaces the old ATP system and provides earnings- 
related benefits based on lifetime earnings. Pension-qualifying income as well 
as benefits are indexed using a modified wage index. The 1994/98 reform also 
introduced the "premium pension:" 2.5% of pension-carrying income is placed 
in an individual investment account2 that pays retirement benefits based on 
investment returns. Guarantee pensions are financed by general revenues, 
while wage earners and employers finance the income and premium pensions.3 
This set of pension arrangements replaced a similar, two part system: the 
basic pension provided a flat-rate benefit while the ATP system paid income- 
related pensions according to "defined benefit" principles. A full ATP plus 
basic pension paid 65 % of average income based on the best 15 years of at 
least 30 years of employment, up to the benefit ceiling. Both tiers were PAYG 
and financed by employer contributions. In 1990, the basic pension contribu- 
tion (7.45% of payroll) financed 85% of benefits (the state paid the rest), while 
the ATP contribution (13.5% of payroll) financed both current benefits and the 
accumulation of savings in the AP funds. Both the basic pension and the ATP 
pensions were indexed to inflation. 
This set of pension arrangements evolved over a comparatively long period. 
In 1914, the Liberal government introduced universal old age and invalidity 
pension insurance that was replaced by the more generous flat rate basic 
pension in 1935. In 1948, the basic pension was raised significantly so that by 
the early 1950s it equalled about 30% of average industrial wages (Ackerby, 
1992). 
During the 1950s, two groups enjoyed generous occupational pensions: state 
and white collar employees. Manual workers led by the Trade Union 
Federation (LO) and backed by the Social Democratic Party (SAP) were eager 
to reduce this disparity. After several years of contentious debate, the SAP-led 
government managed to adopted an earnings-related pension scheme (ATP) in 
1959, over the vehement opposition of the non-socialist parties.4 In 1969, the 
basic pension was complemented with the pension supplement for those not 
covered by ATP or who had a low ATP pension. This supplement was small 
at first, but was successively raised so that it corresponded to about half the 
basic pension in the early 1990s. 
2. The total pension contribution is 18.5% of qualifying wages. 
3. The state pays pension contributions for wage earners who are unemployed, pursuing higher 
education and/or military service, on parental leave, or sick leave. 
4. For discussions of the ATP reform, see Heclo (1974), chapter five. 
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The 1994/98 Reform 
Prior to the 1990s, pension reform never occupied a prominent place on the 
political agenda. However, as the ATP system approached maturity, the Social 
Democratic government appointed an Official Commission of Inquiry in 1984 
to evaluate the system and pinpoint reform needs. The commission deliberated 
for six years, producing a vast amount of expert analysis, but there was no 
agreement on the direction of reform (SOU 1990: 76). The TCO (Confedera- 
tion of White Collar Workers) was the main opponent to reform, refusing to 
accept any change in the best 15 of 30 years benefit formula. 
Sweden's economic crisis in the early 1990s ended the pension stalemate. 
Weak economic growth, rising unemployment, and a growing number of 
retirees led to unanticipated financial pressure on the pension system. A sharp 
deterioration in government finances exacerbated the pension system's 
problems. Between 1990 and 1993, Sweden went from budget surplus to 
recording a deficit of 12.3 % of GDP, and open unemployment increased from 
1.7 % to 8.2 %, prompting massive reductions in public spending (Pontusson, 
1992; Huber & Stephens, 1998). 
Pension reform reached the top of the political agenda in the middle of this 
economic crisis. The economic crisis also contributed to a change in govern- 
ment; the Social Democrats were defeated at the polls in 1991 by a non- 
socialist minority coalition led by the Conservative Party.5 The non-socialist 
coalition now possessed the legislative initiative even if the SAP was still the 
largest party in parliament. Pension reform gathered further momentum when 
a series of expert studies revealed fundamental weaknesses in the pension 
system: the ATP system's sensitivity to economic swings and low growth; pro- 
jected decreases in the AP Funds; the weak link between contributions and 
benefits; and the rising cost of basic pensions (Olsson & Schubert, 1991; 
Br6ms, 1990; Soderstrom, 1991; Lindbeck, 1992). The Swedish Employers 
Federation (SAF) also called for radical reform (Svenska Arbetsgivaref6renin- 
gen, 1990). 
Although the ATP system as a whole was in surplus because of reserves that 
accumulated in the 1960s and 1970s, the long term financial trend was cause 
for concern. Since the early 1980s, ATP payroll contributions no longer 
covered pension costs, so AP fund reserves were tapped to finance the short- 
fall. In 1982, the AP Funds had enough capital to finance benefits for 7.4 years 
without additional contributions. This measure of fund strength had declined 
to 5.1 years in 1992, fuelling fears of AP fund depletion (Riksfirsakringsver- 
ket, 1994). In addition, the growing cost of basic pensions contributed to the 
already dismal state of government finances. 
5. The SAP served as a minority government from 1982-1991. 
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With the major political parties backing some sort of reform, the only 
question was which party would control the reform negotiations. The maturity 
of the system precluded radical privatization, but reform offered the non- 
socialist government the opportunity to introduce changes once considered 
nearly impossible, such as individual pension accounts. Because of its minority 
status, the coalition government was forced to seek outside support. Instead of 
turning to the volatile New Democracy Party,6 the government tried to 
assemble a broader reform coalition including the SAP. The SAP leadership 
had already come out in favour of reform, so cooperation with the non-socialist 
parties was seen as a painful necessity caused by the economic crisis as well 
as an opportunity to block any radical reform proposals. More important, a 
broad reform coalition would allow the SAP to work toward preserving the 
basic structure of the pension system and correct its perceived weaknesses. 
Cooperation between the SAP and the four main non-socialist parties re- 
sulted in the passage of framework legislation in the Spring of 1994, followed 
by detailed legislation in 1998. The parties backing the reform negotiated in 
a small, closed working group rather than within the more open structure of an 
official commission. The working group structure was used for the duration of 
the reform process, from 1991 to 1998. 
The reformed system differs from the existing system in several important 
ways. First, a notional defined contribution (NDC) system based on lifetime 
earnings replaces the best 15 of 30 years benefit formula in the ATP system. 
This tightens the link between contributions and benefits, and reduces some of 
the pension system's redistributive elements. Second, both employers and 
employees pay pension contributions, a change designed to increase public 
awareness of retirement costs. Third, a new index links benefits to wage devel- 
opments and real economic growth and changes in average life expectancy. 
These changes mean that the pension system will be more resistant to econom- 
ic swings and it will be self-financing regardless of the state of the economy. 
There is no formal retirement age. Fourth, spouses may share pension rights 
and military service, child rearing, and education will earn pension rights. 
Finally, 2.5% of the total 18.5% in pension contributions will be placed in an 
individual investment fund, the "premium reserve." In addition, the "guarantee 
pension" replaces the old basic pension and pension supplement. The transition 
to the new system will take 20 years (Proposition 1993/94: 250). 
Five parties backed the pension reform, and the reform package reflects this 
inter-party bargaining. The Christian Democrats and Centre Party advocated 
shared pension rights for spouses, the SAP wanted to retain the obligatory 
system with high replacement rates, while the Liberals and Conservatives 
wanted a more explicit link between contributions and benefits, as well as the 
6. The populist New Democracy party was voted into the Riksdag in 1991. 
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premium reserve. All of the political parties advocated the introduction of the 
notional defined contribution benefit structure, real wage indexing, and 
measures to promote financial sustainability. Although the influence of the 
SAP in the reform process has been substantial, they have acquiesced in three 
main areas: the structure of financing, shared pension rights, and the premium 
reserve system. 
The new pension system provides lower benefits for some groups than the 
old ATP system, particularly those with less than 30 years of employment. 
However, these benefit losses should be considered in the context of the 
"improvements" introduced by the reform. The new pension system is resistant 
to economic and demographic shocks, and the new indexing rules will stop the 
erosion in the real value of ATP pensions. In the old system, accrued rights and 
benefit pay-outs were indexed to inflation. Since wages grow more quickly 
than inflation, a growing share of workers earned incomes above the pension- 
qualification ceiling, for which they accumulated no pension rights. This trend 
threatened to transform the ATP system into a generous basic pension and was 
a serious threat to the earnings-replacement function of the system. The new 
system also corrects the unintended redistribution from lower income groups 
to higher income groups because of the best 15 years of 30 benefit rule. Final- 
ly, the state remains responsible for providing a minimum level of provision 
for all citizens. 
Why did the SAP cooperate in such a radical reform of the public pension 
system? Why did organized labour tacitly support the SAP's reform efforts? 
A non-socialist government passed the first stage of the reform (1994), but the 
SAP played a key role in the reform negotiations, and an SAP minority 
government adopted the subsequent provisions. The close ties between the SAP 
and the LO meant that union interests played an important role in the SAP's 
negotiating position, but this influence had its limits. Unions and other 
organized interests were deliberately excluded from the reform negotiations, 
and the political parties gave their negotiators an unusual degree of independ- 
ence to work out a compromise. This strategy resulted in the minimization of 
veto points and the depoliticisation of the pension issue (cf. Immergut, 1992; 
Bonoli, 2000). All parties agreed to compromise at an early stage, and they 
used the structure of the working group to strengthen their bargaining power 
versus the unions and other organized interests (cf. Anderson, 2001; Anderson 
and Meyer, 2003). 
The Social Democratic Party and organized labour emerge as central actors 
in this brief account of the development of Swedish pensions. The ATP 
struggle was one of the great political victories of the SAP in the postwar 
period and ushered in a long period of Social Democratic dominance. The non- 
socialist parties reluctantly accepted the basic features of the pension system, 
but the 1990s brought an opportunity for reform. The pension system remained 
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popular with voters, but economic and demographic trends threatened the fu- 
ture sustainability of the pension system. As their electoral dominance waned, 
the SAP leadership opted for compromise with the non-socialist parties, and 
in contrast to the heated conflict that led to the 1959 ATP reform, a five party 
coalition negotiated thel994/98 reform. 
The Netherlands 
The development of the Dutch pension system is marked by a comparatively 
late start followed by the swift expansion of benefits. Confessional political 
parties and interest organizations have heavily influenced Dutch politics (see 
Cox, 1985; van Kersbergen, 1995) and these cleavages have left their mark on 
both public and private occupational pensions.7 
The pillarisation of Dutch society into four main groups (socialists, liberals, 
Catholics, and Protestants) significantly shaped early pension policy. The first 
pension law was adopted in 1913, but it covered only workers. Although the 
Labour Party (PvdA) and Liberals (VVD) advocated universal coverage, the 
confessional parties prevailed in their preference for employment-based 
pensions with corporatist administration. Confessional groups wanted to limit 
the role of the state so they pushed for pensions to be administered by 
corporatist bodies with representatives of employers and unions and the 
National Insurance Bank (NIB). This type of administrative arrangement would 
set a strong precedent for all subsequent social welfare legislation. 
WWII marked a turning point in Dutch welfare state development. The 
government in exile in London appointed a commission to plan for future 
social reforms, headed by a leading Labour Party member (van Rijn). Mindful 
of the earlier rejection of universal pensions, the commission recommended 
universal pension insurance. Reformers wanted universal, equal benefits for 
all, but these would be "earned" by residence and financed by wage earner 
contributions, thereby creating solidarity between wage earners and non-wage 
earners. The contribution ceiling was set fairly low, about equal to average 
earnings, so as not to discourage the development of occupational pensions. 
The immediate postwar period saw a succession of "Red-Roman" 
governments in which the Labour Party governed with the confessional parties. 
After the 1946 election, the Labour Party leader DeVrees served as Minister 
of Social Affairs. Conditions seemed favourable for a pension reform of 
Labour's making, but pillarisation had survived the war, and conservative 
confessional groups opposed Labour' s pension reform plans. Minister DeVrees 
secured adoption of an Emergency Pensions Act in 1946 to serve as an interim 
7. This section is based on Cox (1985); Jaspers et al. (2001); and Rigter et al. (1995). 
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measure until a permanent system could be negotiated. The measure passed 
with the votes of the Catholic Party after the Labour Party agreed to base the 
scheme on the insurance principle (see above). The Emergency Act provided 
benefits to all persons over 65, including those with occupational pensions. 
Despite cooperation of the Catholic Party, corporatist interests were divided, 
especially concerning administration. However, the Emergency Act set in 
motion a process in which all citizens were entitled to a public pension. 
Negotiations on permanent legislation dragged on for ten years, but the 
Labour-controlled Ministry of Social Affairs finally prevailed, negotiating the 
provisions of the permanent legislation with the newly created Social 
Economic Council (SER), a tripartite corporatist advisory body. The Emer- 
gency pensions had been in effect for nearly ten years and were very popular, 
prompting the Liberals and more moderate Catholics to side with Labour. The 
reform was adopted by Parliament in 1956, and the new law, the AOW went 
into effect on January 1, 1957. 
Labour's ability to secure Catholic Party support for a temporary pension 
arrangement in 1946 had a decisive impact on the fate of the basic pension. 
The emergency legislation was intended to be temporary but as the parliamen- 
tary stalemate over permanent legislation continued, citizens started to get used 
to the new pensions and they liked the new arrangement. To use the language 
of path dependence, the emergency legislation set the Netherlands on the path 
of a universal, public, basic pension, and ten years of legislative stalemate 
greatly increased the costs of departing from this path (Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 
2000). The new pensions were popular enough to convince moderate Catholics 
to embrace the reform and embolden the SER to ignore the opposition of 
conservative Catholics. In sum, a relatively weak left was forced to compro- 
mise with powerful confessional parties, but the left was able to overcome this 
opposition with clever bargaining and luck. Clever bargaining led to Labour- 
Catholic Party agreement over emergency pension legislation, while the ten 
year policy stalemate turned out to be a crucial advantage for Labour. Every 
year the parliamentary deadlock continued was a year in which more and more 
citizens began to draw pension benefits, thereby contributing to their popu- 
larity and emerging status as a social right. 
Today, the AOW is financed by wage-earner contributions (17.9% of 
income), and 50 years of residence are required for a full pension. In 2003, the 
full net pension benefit for a single person was 70% of the net minimum wage, 
or about EUR 840 net per month for a single pensioner. For married pensioners 
the net pension is 50% of the net minimum wage, or about EUR 600 for each 
spouse. In 1998, AOW spending equalled 4.8% of GDP and provided benefits 
to 2.2 million pensioners (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2001: 
6). 
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Growing pension commitments have necessitated significant increases in 
contribution rates. Since 1957, the contribution rate has increased steadily from 
6.75% of income to 17.9% in 2001, and expert analyses frequently warn of 
even higher contributions.8 Policymakers have responded in two main ways. 
First, there is political agreement on the need to increase labour force 
participation and broaden the tax base without increasing non-wage labour 
costs or income taxes. Second, a 1998 law introduces partial funding into the 
AOW system by requiring the government to contribute EURO 115 million per 
year to the AOW Savings Fund. Reserves and interest earned by the fund are 
intended to help finance future AOW costs. 
In addition to these explicit strategies, governments have followed an 
implicit strategy of shifting the costs of retirement to occupational pensions. 
The overwhelming majority of occupational pension schemes provide a 
defined benefit that includes the AOW. If governments limit the growth of 
AOW benefits (by suspending indexing, for example), this creates pressure on 
occupational pensions to make up the difference. This is exactly what has 
happened during the past 20 years (Clark, 2003). 
Occupational Pensions 
Occupational pensions are regulated by the state but the social partners 
negotiate pension arrangements as part of collective labour agreements. In 
1999, there were 947 different pension funds, including industry-wide pension 
schemes, company pension schemes, pension funds for the self-employed and 
other schemes, such as the ABP system covering civil servants (SER, 2000: 
27). In 1998, employers paid 6.7% of their wage bill into second pillar 
schemes, while employees paid 2.3% of their wages (Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment, 2000: 6). Until recently, the typical benefit formula was 70% 
of the final salary, including the AOW, after 35 to 40 years of employment. 
Although occupational pensions are organized within the market, social 
solidarity is promoted by several features. Coverage is nearly universal; unions 
and employers are equally represented on pension fund governing boards; and 
risks are pooled within entire sectors (Clark, 2003). 
By the 1990s, occupational pension growth prompted calls for cost con- 
tainment. Like the AOW, the occupational pension system faces substantial 
demographic pressure, so reform efforts emphasize reducing costs, especially 
for future retirees. Since most occupational pensions are defined benefit, final 
salary schemes, costs will increase substantially as individual pension schemes 
8. See for example, Nelissen (1994). 
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mature. In response, many pension schemes have switched to average earnings 
formulas (SER, 2000). In 1987, about 77 percent of wage-earners participated 
in final pay schemes, about 14 percent participated in average earnings sys- 
tems, with the rest covered by other benefit formulas. In 1999, the number of 
participants in final pay schemes had decreased to about 62% and the number 
in average career earnings schemes had increased to 25% (SER, 2000: 161). 
Recent policy changes also emphasize reducing the male breadwinner bias 
in supplementary pensions and increasing coverage to new groups, especially 
part time workers and workers with fixed contracts. In 1997 the Social and 
Economic Council (SER) facilitated the negotiation of a "Pension Covenant" 
between the social partners and the government. The government and social 
partners were particularly concerned about controlling pension costs because 
of their share in total labour costs; increasing the coverage of supplementary 
pensions; and modernizing benefit rules in order to increase flexibility and 
individual choice (Stichting van de Arbeid, 1997). In particular, the social 
partners agreed to reduce reliance on final pay benefit schemes and to expand 
coverage of part time and flexible workers. The results of the covenant have 
been evaluated positively (SER, 2001) but the recent stock market downturn 
has led to tense discussions about the regulations governing the coverage rate 
of supplementary pensions. Most pension tunds have significant investments 
in stocks (30-40% of assets), and the bear market has led to heavy losses. The 
reserves of many pension funds fell below the 100% coverage rate for the first 
time in 2002. The drastic deterioration of the financial position of many funds 
prompted the pensions regulator, PVK, to demand tougher rules governing 
pension fund solvency. For most funds, restoring solvency means increasing 
premiums, suspending the indexation of pensions, or both. For example, the 
Netherlands' largest pension fund, ABP (for civil servants) raised premiums 
from 13% to 15% of qualifying income, and announced a switch from final 
salary benefit formula to average career earnings formula starting in 2004. 
The pillarisation of Dutch society has significantly influenced the shape and 
development of occupational pensions. Confessional groups opposed statist 
arrangements because they wanted to retain confessional influence on the 
scope and administration of social policies. In contrast to Sweden and 
Denmark, the introduction of a public occupational pension system has never 
been seriously considered in the Netherlands. First, funded occupational 
pensions have a long history in the Netherlands, and occupational pensions are 
explicitly seen as an instrument of wage policy. Occupational pensions are 
negotiated as part of wage contracts so transferring them to the public sector 
would deprive unions and employers of important bargaining tools. The state 
provides a regulatory framework for occupational pensions, but the social 
partners have considerable freedom to negotiate the details of occupational 
pensions, and they jealously guard this prerogative. Second, the initially 
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uneven coverage of occupational pensions meant that "lock-in" effects 
generated a powerful coalition in favour of extending the existing system to 
new groups rather than transforming it into one public scheme. Unions and 
employers that negotiated the first occupational schemes did not want to 
relinquish this tool of wage bargaining, so workers without occupational pen- 
sion coverage had every incentive to try to achieve coverage through collective 
bargaining. As the popularity of occupational pensions increased, the state 
stepped in to provide incentives for extending coverage to new groups (see 
below). 
Denmark9 
The current pension regime in Denmark includes four parts: the income-tested 
basic pension; the modest ATP scheme; funded labour market pensions 
providing earnings-related pensions for nearly all employees; and voluntary 
private pension savings accounts. Assets in the latter three schemes are 
considerable: ATP assets equal 19% of GDP, capital in labour market pension 
funds totals 29% of GDP, and assets in private individual insurance accounts 
amount to 29% of GDP. 
The Danish public pension resembles the Swedish except for the small size 
of the ATP and the larger size of collectively bargained occupational pensions. 
Denmark introduced public old-age pensions very early, in 1891. 1922 
legislation expanded pension coverage, but it was not until 1956 that benefits 
became universal. In 1964 benefits were improved and an income-tested 
supplement was introduced. Today, the basic pension is income-tested, but few 
pensioners fail this test and lose their public benefits. 
As Esping-Andersen (1985) notes, Danish social democrats had the mis- 
fortune of facing strong liberal competition in social welfare policy, so Danish 
social policies are a curious blend of social democratic and liberal values. 
When the social democrats joined with liberals to improve the basic pension 
scheme, they had to accept generous tax incentives for private pensions. 
The inability of the Social Democrats and trade unions to dominate postwar 
pension politics meant that developments proceeded along two tracks. First, 
liberals and social democrats supported the expansion of the basic pension. 
Second, development toward a Swedish-style ATP stalled. The liberals and 
conservatives feared that a public supplementary pension scheme would lead 
to politically controlled investment funds. The Social Democrats themselves 
were divided on the issue. Many Social Democrats opposed a public pension 
9. Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on Green-Pedersen (2003); Ploug (2001); Esping- 
Andersen (1985); Plovsing (1997); and Ministry of Social Affairs (2001). 
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system that would reinforce income differentials among wage earners and pre- 
ferred instead to address benefit inadequacies within the structure of the 
existing pension system. The deadlock resulted in the expansion of the basic 
pension, the introduction of the ATP, and increased take-up rates for individual 
private pensions. 
Danish social democratic attempts to introduce public supplementary 
pensions were a notable failure. The LO campaigned to introduce a Swedish- 
style ATP in the early 1960s, but this resulted only in watered down legislation 
passed by the Social Democratic coalition in 1964. Unable to legislate 
substantial public supplementary pensions, the government opted for the small 
ATP and improvements in the basic pension in 1964 (see above). The Social 
Democrats' task was surely made more difficult by the cumulative impact of 
tax incentives for private pensions passed earlier. Unlike Swedish social 
democrats, the Danes had no formula for attracting the middle classes to their 
political project via public, supplementary pensions. The ATP provides a flat 
rate benefit based on previous hours worked rather than income. Only wage 
earners pay contributions, and despite the small size of this program, accu- 
mulated assets equal more than 19% of GDP. 
For many low wage earners, the basic pension and the modest ATP benefits 
provided adequate pension coverage. In contrast, higher income earners, like 
the metalworkers, experienced a significant drop in income after retirement 
because of the inadequacy of the basic pension and ATP in relation to previous 
wages. It was precisely this group that led the effort to improve earnings 
related pension coverage among private sector workers. However, the metal- 
workers would have to wait much longer than their counterparts in the public 
sector. 
The vacuum left by the failure of ATP has been filled with a variety of 
labour market related pensions. In the early 1960s, when the political 
establishment could not agree on the introduction of supplementary pensions, 
such a scheme was introduced for wage earners in the public sector. As the 
welfare state expanded, supplementary pensions for teachers, nurses, and other 
professionals were a way to enhance the attractiveness of public sector 
employment. According to Ploug (2001), this move set a decisive precedent for 
the rest of the labour market twenty years later. 
By the 1980s, the Social Democrats and liberals had changed their positions 
regarding occupational pensions. One important economic factor was persistent 
deficits on the current account, caused by Denmark's low savings rate (among 
other things). The accumulation of pension savings was one way to address 
this. Another contributing factor was the demands of some LO unions for im- 
proved supplementary pension coverage, particularly the Metalworkers Union. 
At the time, however, wage bargaining negotiations were centralized, and this 
precluded the Metalworkers and other unions from negotiating supplementary 
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pensions as part of wage contracts. Separate pension agreements could only be 
negotiated on a lower level and existing institutions ruled this out. 
By the mid 1980s, the Metalworkers advocated a centralized solution to 
their pension concerns and demanded that LO work towards a legislated, 
centralized system. Other unions opposed the Metalworkers demands, how- 
ever. The low wage unions in the LO, who were basically satisfied with the 
coverage of existing arrangements, feared that making occupational pensions 
the centrepiece of their bargaining with the non-socialist government would 
distract attention from other bargaining issues. In addition, the lower wage 
unions argued that occupational pensions would reinforce income inequality 
in retirement. 
These divisions among the LO unions were mirrored in the Social Demo- 
cratic Party. The party was already divided on the issue of occupational 
pensions because of fears similar to those of low wage LO unions: occupa- 
tional pensions would reinforce income inequality in retirement. Despite these 
divisions, in 1985 the LO and Social Democratic Party agreed on a proposal 
for economy-wide, funded, supplementary pensions. Wage earner representa- 
tives would manage the fund capital. 
The non-socialist government headed by Poul Schliter supported the 
expansion of occupational pensions, but the coalition opposed the LO-Social 
Democratic Plan as did the employers. Despite what appeared to be a united 
LO-Social Democratic front, both the unions and the Social Democrats 
continued to be internally divided on the issue, and the proposal ultimately 
failed. Social Democratic opponents advocated further expansion of the basic 
pension instead. The non-socialist government, employers and unions finally 
agreed on the outlines of a decentralized system of occupational pensions in 
1989. By now, Denmark's competitiveness position had deteriorated signi- 
ficantly and there was widespread support for wage moderation and higher 
savings to offset the current account deficit. The LO was now prepared to 
accept collectively bargained occupational pensions to improve coverage for 
its middle and higher income members. The Social Democrats remained 
opposed to the non-socialist government's plans for expanding labour market 
pensions, preferring a legislative solution. In order to increase the pressure on 
the Social Democrats to cooperate with the minority coalition to adopt 
occupational pension framework legislation, the LO began negotiations with 
the employers and the government. At first the strategy worked, and the 
government initiated negotiations with the Social Democrats, but the talks soon 
broke down. By now, the LO considered its alternatives to be exhausted and 
viewed decentralized labour marked pensions as the only remaining solution 
to its occupational pension problem (Green-Pedersen, in press). 
The first steps toward this new model were taken in 1989 when unions for 
unskilled public sector workers negotiated a separate pension deal. Metalwork- 
304 Canadian Journal of Sociology 
ers took similar steps in 1991, setting a precedent for the rest of the private 
sector. Most occupational schemes are defined contribution. The coverage rate 
of occupational pensions was 84% in 1997, up from about one third in the late 
1970s. 
Why did unions finally accept the expansion of funded, decentralized 
labour market pensions as the solution to their pension dilemma? First, the 
unions wanted some control over pension fund governance, but this was pre- 
cisely the issue on which the non-socialist government would not budge. 
Particularly the Liberal Party was immovable on this issue. Similarly, the 
Social Democratic opposition was resolute in its resistance to decentralized 
pension funds. The distance between the government coalition and the Social 
Democratic opposition was too great to permit any sort of compromise on this 
issue. For the LO, participation in pension fund governance (with employers) 
was a second best option that it accepted in order to finally improve pension 
coverage for its middle and higher income members. Moreover, union 
participation in pension fund administration had advantages: influence over 
investment decisions and selective incentives for workers to join unions 
participating in pension plans (Green-Pedersen, in press). 
The Three Pension Systems Compared 
Bonoli (2003) argues that European pension systems cluster into two groups, 
"social insurance countries" and "multipillar" countries. In social insurance 
countries, public arrangements dominate retirement income provision, and the 
private and occupational pension sectors are relatively small. In multipillar 
countries, the state provides only a minimum pension while occupational and 
private arrangements provide additional benefits. In Bonoli's scheme, Sweden 
(along with Germany and France) is a social insurance country while the 
Netherlands and Denmark are multipillar countries (along with the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland). The institutional structure of pension provision 
heavily influences the logic of change in each cluster. In social insurance 
countries, politicians legislate changes in benefit levels and contribution rates. 
In multipillar countries, the public pension sector is small, so politicians' 
responsibility for making potentially difficult decisions is more limited than in 
social insurance systems. Instead, private actors (firms, unions, pension funds) 
are responsible for adjusting pension levels and contribution rates to changing 
economic and demographic conditions. This implies that change should be 
easier in multipillar countries than in social insurance countries because 
electoral risks are low. 
This article takes issue with Bonoli's arguments in two ways. First, the 
article demonstrates that despite differences in institutional structures, the 
Swedish, Danish and Dutch pension systems produce broadly similar social 
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outcomes. Even though Denmark and the Netherlands have large private 
occupational pension sectors, Dutch and Danish old age poverty rates and 
income equality are similar to Sweden's. Moreover, Dutch and Danish private 
occupational pensions display important elements of solidarity: coverage is 
nearly universal, unions and employers administer pension funds, and risks are 
pooled within entire sectors (Clark, 2003). Bonoli's classification does not 
capture these similarities. 
Second, the distinction between multipillar and social insurance countries 
probably overestimates differences in the logic of change typical of each 
cluster. Denmark and the Netherlands are multipillar countries with relatively 
large public pension sectors. Current public pension spending in both countries 
is roughly equal to private occupational pension expenditures. Similarly, about 
half of Dutch pensioners currently receive an occupational pension, and the 
proportion is similar in Denmark. Thus it may be possible that multipillar 
countries will exhibit two logics of change, the electoral logic associated with 
the public basic pension and the market logic associated with private 
occupational pensions. However, it is also plausible that the logic of change 
depends on institutional features of pension schemes common to both public 
and private pensions. Features of the reformed Swedish system (NDC, 
automatic stabilizers) vastly decrease the need for political intervention to 
adjust contribution rates and benefits and make it arguably more stable than a 
multipillar system like the Dutch. Dutch private actors (pension fund boards) 
have recently cut indexing and raised contributions but the context is highly 
politicized as private actors call for improved pension fund regulation and 
supervision. 
Despite recent stock market losses, occupational pensions in the Nether- 
lands and Denmark will continue to grow in importance, and as they grow, the 
three pension systems will increasingly diverge in terms of social outcomes. 
Dutch spending on supplementary pension benefits (about 4% of GDP) is 
nearly equal to AOW spending (4.3% of GDP). Today, more than 90% of wage 
earners participate in a supplementary pension plan, but only 50% of current 
pensioners receive supplementary pension income (Carey, 2002). As the 
number of retirees with supplementary pension income increases, income 
distribution among retirees is likely to more closely resemble the income 
distribution among wage earners than is currently the case. Moreover, if the 
trend away from final pay to average earnings benefit formulas continues, as 
is likely, this will result in growing differences in supplementary pension 
income among retirees. Both of these long term trends will lead to greater 
inequality among pensioners. 
The Danish occupational pension sector is likely to exhibit similar effects, 
with a somewhat different dynamic. Unlike the Netherlands where nearly all 
supplementary pensions are defined benefit, most Danish occupational pen- 
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sions are defined contribution. Like the Netherlands, the growing maturity of 
occupational pension plans will almost certainly lead to increased inequality 
among pensioners as those with higher incomes during employment receive 
higher retirement incomes. However, the defined contribution structure of 
Danish occupational pensions will mean that wage earners bear the investment 
risks associated with pension savings. Thus pension benefits will reflect not 
only differences in previous income but also differences in investment 
performance. All of this is likely to add up to increased inequality unless offset 
by income tax measures. 
The Swedish pension system is also likely to experience increased ine- 
quality among retirees as the reformed pension system matures. The lifetime 
earnings benefit formula will result in greater income differences among 
retirees, as will the income from the new premium pension. However, given 
that a smaller share of pension income is managed privately, the trend towards 
increased inequality is likely to be weaker in Sweden than in Denmark and the 
Netherlands. 
The impact of pension system maturity on the organization of pension 
savings also deserves comment. The Swedish, Danish, and Dutch pension 
systems all have comparatively high levels of pre-funding, but the structure of 
pension assets differs substantially. Sweden stands out for the large public 
pension funds built up in the decades after the introduction of the ATP system. 
These funds were primarily used to finance affordable housing (among other 
things) and only later were relatively small amounts invested in equities. One 
of the most significant effects of the 1994/98 pension reform will be the 
gradual reduction of the AP Funds. In 1992, the AP Funds amounted to more 
than 30% of GDP, but by 2001 their level had fallen to 22.4% of GDP."' Part 
of this decline is due to stock market losses in 2000 and 2001, but the reform 
implies that the downward trend will continue for two reasons. First, the AP 
Funds financed some of the costs of switching to the new system" and second, 
the AP Funds will continue to pay some of the costs of the new income 
pension. Moreover, as the AP Funds decrease, the assets in the new premium 
reserve will increase, and in two to three decades will exceed those of the AP 
Funds. This long term trend amounts to a gradual privatization of pension 
savings in Sweden, and a major victory for the non-socialist parties. 
Finally, the impact of the benefit formula on financial sustainability merits 
discussion. The Dutch case demonstrates that 100% funding requirements are 
not necessarily the best route to financial stability, at least when combined 
10. Own calculation, from Regeringens skrivelse 2002/03: 130, Redovisning av AP-fondernas 
verksanmhet 2002. 
11. See Anderson and Weaver (2003) for details. 
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with defined benefit pensions. The recent bear market has resulted in signi- 
ficant losses for most Dutch pension funds and prompted drastic premium 
increases and/or benefit cuts. The effects of supplementary pension policy are 
thus pro-cyclical. In the current downturn, premium increases and reduced 
pensions lead to a reduction of already-shrinking purchasing power. The same 
is true during an economic expansion; as pension fund returns increase, pre- 
miums can be reduced and pensions increased, resulting in increased purchas- 
ing power for firms and consumers. These developments can fuel inflation and 
lead to an overheated economy. In other words, the functioning of the supple- 
mentary pension system contributed to an overheated economy in the late 
1990s and is exacerbating the current recession. Economic developments 
during the past decade demonstrate the weaknesses of the Dutch supplementary 
pension system, and policymakers have only begun to grapple with these prob- 
lems. 
In contrast to the Netherlands, the Danish and Swedish pension systems are 
more financially stable. The recent Swedish reform includes automatic 
stabilizers, including the switch to the notional defined contribution structure, 
the introduction of a life expectancy index, and other balancing mechanisms.12 
Danish occupational pensions are similarly less vulnerable to short term 
economic swings, but this is largely because pensions are defined contribution. 
Individuals bear the risks associated with fund performance, but they do so 
over a long period of time as they accumulate pension savings, so the effects 
of short term economic swings are not felt as immediately and as strongly as 
they are in the Netherlands. 
Conclusion 
This article emphasizes the political mobilization of the left and its coalitions 
with other societal groups in accounting for the development of pension re- 
gimes in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. The political strength of the 
Swedish SAP in alliance with the trade unions contributed to the emergence of 
a statist pension system. In the Netherlands and Denmark, divisions within the 
trade unions and within the Danish Social Democratic Party had important 
effects on the organization of supplementary pensions. In both countries, a 
politically weak and divided left settled for collectively regulated but privately 
organized supplementary pensions. 
Given their political weakness, how did the Left in Denmark and the 
Netherlands achieve pension policy outcomes similar to those achieved by a 
strong Left in Sweden? First, the Left in Denmark and the Netherlands were 
12. See Anderson and Weaver (2003) for details. 
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important players in the introduction of the universal basic pension, which is 
crucial for explaining low poverty rates in Denmark and the Netherlands (and 
Sweden). The Dutch Labour Party joined with the Catholic Party to introduce 
emergency pension legislation immediately after World War II, and the 
subsequent pension deadlock led to the entrenchment of emergency pensions. 
The Danish Liberal Party joined with the Social Democrats in the establish- 
ment and expansion of the basic pension. 
Second, divisions internal to Danish unions and the Social Democratic Party 
hampered efforts to legislate occupational pensions, but union strength ensured 
that occupational pensions were part of wage contracts at the sectoral and not 
the firm level. To the extent that unions pursue the goals of solidarity and 
equality in their wage (and pension) negotiations with employers, these values 
will be reflected in the design of occupational pension schemes. And as noted, 
lower income wage earners already received adequate coverage via the basic 
pension and the ATP, so the structure of the growing labour market pension 
sector mainly applies to middle and higher income groups. 
The Dutch Labour Party and unions never seriously campaigned for public 
supplementary pensions. Labour defined the pension issue as expanding basic 
coverage, rather than legislating occupational pensions. Like Danish unions, 
unions in the Netherlands possess enough bargaining strength to pursue 
strategies based on solidarity and equality (cf. Myles and Pierson, 2001). In 
other words, collective bargaining provides an opportunity for union influence 
even when the legislative route to occupational pension coverage has been 
closed off. 
The experiences of Denmark and the Netherlands suggest that different 
pension regimes are capable of producing "social democratic" outcomes such 
as poverty alleviation, reducing income inequality, and covering various risk 
profiles. While mandated private supplementary pensions may produce social 
democratic social outcomes, the dominance of state provision does seem cru- 
cial for producing social democratic political outcomes. Labour's political 
weakness in the Netherlands and Denmark contributed to its inability to 
achieve more than the basic pension in the public pension sphere. Moreover, 
union fragmentation along religious lines in the Netherlands and along craft 
lines in Denmark made it difficult for labour to pursue a unified strategy 
concerning supplementary pensions. Over time, the development of supple- 
mentary private pensions in both countries reinforced labour's weakness. 
Whereas the Swedish Social Democrats used the supplementary pension issue 
to mobilize middle class support, this strategy failed in Denmark and was 
never really attempted in the Netherlands. 
Myles and Pierson (2001) argue that pensions are a classic case of path 
dependent change, and this article confirms this claim. Given that governments 
and pension funds make pension promises decades in advance, the notion of 
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a "path" is inherent in pension development, and actors adapt their behaviour 
to the prevailing structure of pension provision. In all three countries, initial 
choices concerning the structure of basic and occupational pensions signifi- 
cantly shaped subsequent pension development. One of the reasons the conflict 
over Swedish ATP pensions was so bitter is that the non-socialist parties 
understood the long-term implications of the SAP plan: citizens would adapt 
to the public system, private savings would decrease, and as each year passed 
it would be more difficult to switch to a privately organized system. In the 
1990s, however, the ATP system was not irrevocably "locked in," and the non- 
socialist parties exploited the political opening created by their 1991 election 
victory to negotiate substantial changes to the ATP system. Ironically, the 
existence of large buffer funds in the ATP system assisted the non-socialists in 
their efforts because the capital in the funds could be used to finance the 
transition to the new system. Without this financial cushion, elements such as 
the premium reserve would have been financially impossible. 
Past choices also decisively shaped Danish and Dutch pension development. 
Social Democratic attempts to introduce a Swedish-style ATP in the 1960s 
were hampered by the earlier growth of private and occupational pensions that 
continued to expand as the Left tried to legislate comprehensive occupational 
pensions. A similar dynamic characterized Dutch basic pensions: during ten 
years of deadlocked pension negotiations, the 1946 emergency pensions 
became very popular and citizens adapted their retirement savings strategies 
to this scheme. By 1956, the entrenchment of the emergency pensions gave the 
Labor Party sufficient resources to secure adoption of the AOW law. 
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